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Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice 
Jason Baehr 
Loyola Marymount University 
 
My concern in this paper is with two perennial questions in the philosophy of 
education and educational theory: What are the proper aims or goals of education? What 
are the most fitting ways of achieving these goals? The answers I defend draw heavily from 
recent research within virtue epistemology on intellectual character virtues like curiosity, 
open-mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual courage, intellectual 
rigor, and intellectual honesty.1 I argue that education should aim at fostering growth in 
these traits and provide some indication of what it might look to educate in this way.  
  I begin with a brief account of the basic structure of intellectual virtues. Next, I 
sketch three arguments for thinking that fostering growth in intellectual virtues should be 
a central educational aim. Finally, I entertain two objections to this claim. In response to 
the second objection, I also identify several educational practices and strategies aimed at 
fostering intellectual virtues. As this brief overview suggests, the paper is broad in scope 
and largely programmatic. The unfortunate but necessary result is that several details will 
have to be left unspecified and a number of questions raised but then set aside for future 
consideration.  
1. The Basic Structure of an Intellectual Virtue 
There is broad agreement among virtue epistemologists (e.g. Montmarquet 1993, 
Zagzebski 1996, Roberts and Wood 2007, and Baehr 2011) that intellectual virtues exhibit 
a general two-tier structure. At a basic motivational level, all intellectual virtues involve 
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something like a “love” of epistemic goods. An intellectually virtuous person is one who 
desires and is committed to the pursuit of goods like knowledge, truth, and understanding. 
It is this intrinsic epistemic orientation that permits a distinction between intellectual 
virtues and what are typically thought of as moral virtues.2  
While intellectual virtues share a common motivational basis, each individual virtue 
also has its own characteristic activity or psychology—an activity or psychology that is 
rooted in an underlying “love” of epistemic goods. Put formally, the idea is that for any 
intellectual virtue V, a subject S possesses V only if S is (a) disposed to manifest a certain 
activity or psychology characteristic of V (b) out of a love of epistemic goods.3 A curious 
person, for instance, is quick to wonder and ask why-questions out of a desire to 
understand the world around her. An open-minded person is willing to consider alternative 
standpoints because he sees that doing so is helpful for arriving at an accurate grasp of 
those standpoints and of the matter at hand. And an intellectually courageous person is 
disposed to persist in beliefs or inquiries that she has reason to think will lead her to the 
truth despite the fact that doing so may put her in harm’s way. 
2. Intellectual Virtues as an Educational Aim 
 With this general structural model before us, I turn to a defense of the claim that 
fostering growth in intellectual virtues should be a central educational aim.  
2.1. Thickening familiar educational goals 
It is a near platitude that education should aim at fostering “lifelong learning.” But 
for as often and pervasively as this goal is espoused in educational institutions at every 
level, exactly what it amounts to is far from clear. This is unfortunate, for it is plausible to 
think that ordinary usage of “lifelong learning” and related terms, while typically less than 
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very thoughtful and careful, nevertheless is an attempt to get at a reasonably substantive, 
determinate, and compelling educational ideal.4 Thus it is worth trying to understand what 
this ideal might amount to, that is, to identify some of the specific psychological qualities, 
abiding convictions, ingrained habits, or essential skills distinguish the lifelong learner 
from the rest of us. 
The notions of intellectual character and intellectual virtue are extremely useful in 
this regard, for we can think of intellectual virtues as the personal qualities or 
characteristics of a lifelong learner. To be a lifelong learner, one must possess a reasonably 
broad base of practical and theoretical knowledge. But possessing even a great deal of 
knowledge is not sufficient. Being a lifelong learner also requires being curious and 
inquisitive. It requires a firm and powerful commitment to learning. It demands 
attentiveness and reflectiveness. And given the various ways in which a commitment to 
lifelong learning might get derailed, it also requires intellectual determination, 
perseverance, and courage. In other words, being a lifelong learner is largely constituted by 
the possession of various intellectual virtues.  
This claim is confirmed and illuminated by the two-tier structural model sketched in 
the previous section. According to the model, intellectual virtues flow from and are 
grounded in a firm and intelligent love of epistemic goods. Again, this orientation forms the 
psychological basis of intellectual virtues. This way of thinking about intellectual virtues 
makes good sense of the familiar idea, also noted above, that “lifelong learners” possess a 
firm and powerful commitment to the life of the mind. By providing a plausible way of 
understanding this aspect of the putative psychology of a lifelong learner, the structural 
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model lends further plausibility to the idea that intellectual virtues are the personal 
qualities or character traits of a lifelong learner. 
 The possession of intellectual virtues is not merely a matter of good epistemic 
motivation. According to the structural model, each intellectual virtue also involves a 
disposition to engage in a certain sort of cognitive activity—an activity that distinguishes 
that virtue from other intellectual virtues. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the 
possession of an intellectual virtue also requires having good reason to think that the 
activity characteristic of the virtue in question will be useful for achieving one’s epistemic 
aims.5 If these claims are correct, that is, if possessing an intellectual virtue involves being 
disposed to engage in a certain sort of cognitive activity that one has good reason think will 
be useful for achieving one’s epistemic ends, it follows that, in addition to the motivational 
component just identified, intellectual virtues also have a competence and a rationality 
component.  This also fits well with the idea that intellectual virtues comprise the personal 
or characterological aspect of being a “lifelong learner,” for lifelong learners presumably 
are not merely those who love learning and knowledge; they are also skilled and intelligent 
in their pursuit of these ends.   
We have seen that the language and concepts of intellectual virtue provide a 
plausible way of fleshing out the familiar but nebulous ideal of lifelong learning.6 But what 
exactly follows about the proper aims or goals of education? Unlike the concept of lifelong 
learning, virtue concepts are “thick concepts.”7 They have both a normative and a richly 
descriptive dimension. To say that Bob is open-minded, for instance, is to pick out 
something good or commendable or admirable about Bob; but it is also to convey 
something about what Bob is like—about what he is disposed to do, feel, think, say, and so 
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on. Given this rich descriptive dimension, one benefit of “educating for intellectual virtues” 
or of treating intellectual character growth as a central educational aim is that doing so 
provides a more concrete and action-guiding framework for making education about the 
formation of lifelong learners. Put another way, by thinking of lifelong learning in the 
relevant characterological terms, we set ourselves a clearer target and thus a target that we 
stand a better chance of hitting. 
2.2. Rigorous and Personal 
In The Child and the Curriculum, John Dewey introduces a dichotomy between two 
familiar accounts of how and what students should be taught. According to one way of 
thinking, the content and structure of an academic curriculum should be derived strictly 
from the content and structure of the corresponding spheres of reality. It is the job of 
teachers and students to expand and conform their minds to these spheres, for this alone 
makes possible the kind of knowledge and understanding that are proper to education. On 
the other end of the spectrum is the view that curriculum should be determined entirely on 
the basis of the interests, inclinations, and abilities of students. Their psychology alone 
should dictate what is taught and how it is taught. This is essential, the argument goes, to 
inspiring genuine interest and motivation, which in turn are essential to genuine learning 
(1902: 7-15). 
Unsurprisingly, Dewey treats this as a false dichotomy. He argues that while 
students generally are not equipped to dictate what and how they learn, curriculum should 
be formulated and presented in ways that are sensitive to their actual experience or 
psychology. Disciplinary knowledge must, as Dewey puts it, be “psychologized” (32). 
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My interest here is not with Dewey’s positive view about how to balance “the 
curriculum and the child” but rather with the dichotomy itself. On one plausible 
understanding, this is a dichotomy between two fundamental educational values.8 On the 
one hand, a good education ought to be rigorous: it ought to be demanding, stretch student 
thinking, and provide more than a short-term or superficial grasp of the material. On the 
other hand, a good education should also be personal: it should be attentive to and 
demonstrate care for who students are (e.g. their fundamental beliefs and values) and for 
the persons they are becoming. 
A second compelling feature of an intellectual virtues approach is that it provides a 
plausible way of integrating or harmonizing these potentially conflicting values. We can 
begin to see how by being a bit more precise about the proper aim of intellectual virtues. As 
I have argued elsewhere, intellectual virtues aim at deep explanatory understanding of 
epistemically significant subject matters.9 An intellectually virtuous person is relatively 
unmoved by trivial or frivolous subject matters. After all, intellectual virtues are personally 
admirable traits. And a love of “junk knowledge,” for example, of the names listed in the 
Wichita phonebook under the letter “R” or the number of grains in a random cubic 
centimeter of the Sahara, is hardly admirable.10 Nor is an intellectually virtuous person 
content with a fleeting or superficial grasp of epistemically worthy subject matters. Rather, 
her aim is deep and penetrating understanding: she is concerned with a firm personal 
grasp of basic principles, underlying causes, and how the various facts within a given 
domain hang together.11 
The latter point in particular underscores an important connection between 
intellectual virtues and intellectual rigor. Deep understanding, which again is the proper 
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aim of intellectual virtues, is a significant and demanding cognitive achievement. For a 
subject matter or body of knowledge to admit of deep understanding, it must have a certain 
structural complexity a grasp of which requires sustained effort, reflection, concentration, 
persistence, and the like. For this reason, educating for deep understanding is necessarily a 
rigorous process.12 And, since intellectual virtues aim at deep understanding, educating for 
intellectual virtues is necessarily rigorous as well. One cannot aim to promote significant 
growth in intellectual virtues in the absence of a serious commitment to rigor.  
Rigorous educational approaches can, of course, prove intellectually stifling and 
oppressive. They can be excessively demanding or otherwise misaligned with the 
psychology or developmental stages of students. As a result they can extinguish a student’s 
natural desire to learn. An intellectual virtues approach, by contrast, is particularly well 
positioned to avoid this kind of excess. For, if a teacher is attempting to nurture intellectual 
character growth in his students, he will pay very close attention to what his students are 
capable of and to their fundamental beliefs, attitudes, and feelings toward learning. His 
expectations of his students will be high, but this orientation will be constrained by an 
ongoing concern with the development of their intellectual character. In this way, an 
intellectual virtues educational model is poised to strike a sensible and attractive balance 
between promoting academic rigor, on the one hand, while also being sufficiently caring 
and personal, on the other.  
Not every educational model can claim this advantage. The educational framework 
embodied in the well-known Summerhill School founded by A.S. Neill, for instance, 
evidently runs the risk of sacrificing intellectual rigor in an effort to be sufficiently 
personal. On the other end of the spectrum, certain approaches to “classical education” 
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favor a top-down, highly rigorous approach that threatens to neglect (if not extinguish) 
students’ natural affinity for learning.13 
To further illustrate the relative uniqueness of this advantage, let us compare an 
intellectual virtues approach with one that is more like-minded, namely, an approach 
aimed at fostering “critical thinking.” Critical thinking educational models are a diverse lot. 
Some combine a focus on critical thinking skills with a focus on the “critical spirit” or good 
intellectual “dispositions” which are very much like (if not identical to) intellectual 
character virtues.14 For our purposes, it will be helpful to consider an approach that focuses 
strictly on the development of critical thinking skills or abilities.15 Let us stipulate that the 
approach in question is rigorous, demanding competence in complex forms of reasoning 
across a wide range of different content areas. While satisfying the desideratum of 
intellectual rigor, there is no guarantee that this approach will be sufficiently personal. The 
primary concern of a teacher on this model will be whether her students are developing the 
ability to reason in the relevant ways. She might be unconcerned with whether they are 
developing a motivation or inclination to think in these ways outside of class. And, even if 
she does have this concern, it will not (as such) be situated within a broader commitment 
to nurturing the intellectual character of her students, that is, to their becoming more 
curious, open-minded, fair-minded, intellectually courageous, persevering, and so on. In 
trying to impart the relevant skills, she might even be oblivious to such considerations. 
A second good reason, then, for treating growth in intellectual virtues as a worthy 
educational aim is that doing so provides a very natural and compelling way of making 
education suitably rigorous and personal. 
2.3. Educational meaning and purpose 
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Many teachers enter the profession because they regard teaching as meaningful 
work. They expect it to bring significant purpose to their lives. They consider it their 
vocation. Similarly, most students can recount moments in which they experienced 
learning as meaningful, inspiring, and intrinsically rewarding. A worthy educational aim or 
framework ought to make sense of the putative meaning and purpose of teaching and 
learning. Specifically, it should give teachers and students a lively sense and a better 
understanding of the value of education.  
Not all educational aims or approaches have this effect. Indeed, much that goes on in 
education today makes it difficult to see or feel the importance of teaching or learning. This 
is clearly the case where educational success is defined—even if just implicitly—in terms of 
high scores on standardized tests and where teaching is geared toward the achievement of 
such scores.16 Conditions like these can make honest teachers wonder why they got into 
the teaching profession in the first place. They can make their initial pedagogical 
aspirations and expectations seem hopelessly naïve. They can also leave students doubting 
the value of their schooling. Similarly, at the post-secondary level, to the extent that the 
(implicit or explicit) aim of teaching is to disseminate information or knowledge proper to 
a range of academic disciplines (much of which can be accessed online at little or no cost) 
and academic excellence is closely associated with an ability to memorize and “regurgitate” 
this information, the value of a university education might reasonably be questioned, 
particularly when it comes with a price tag in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Conceiving of education as properly aimed at nurturing growth in intellectual 
character virtues provides a much better way of capturing the putative meaning and 
purpose of teaching and learning. Again, if a teacher is educating for intellectual virtues, his 
 10 
aim will be to mold and shape his students as persons—to impact their fundamental 
orientation toward epistemic goods and the practices that facilitate these goods. He will be 
concerned with helping them understand why knowledge and learning are valuable.17 He 
will also take measures aimed at getting them to care about these things. The value of such 
an impact is difficult to quibble with. Most of us desire—at least in our better moments—to 
be and to surround ourselves with persons concerned with knowledge and understanding 
and who are inquisitive, attentive, open-minded, intellectually honest, intellectually 
courageous, and the like. These are attractive and desirable qualities.  
Intellectual virtues also have several important practical payoffs. To see what some 
of these are, note that the traits in question manifest themselves most obviously and 
centrally in good thinking. Accordingly, by educating for intellectual virtues, teachers are 
equipping their students with the skills and supporting beliefs, attitudes, and feelings that 
dispose them toward good thinking. As such, they are preparing them for at least two 
important kinds of success outside of the classroom.  
First, they are helping prepare their students for successful careers. There are few 
jobs or professions in which the disposition to think in open, careful, critical, or innovative 
ways is not prized. Indeed, many have observed that given the centrality of technology to 
present-day economies, a good portion of the technical skills and knowledge currently 
taught to students will be obsolete or nearly obsolete by the time these students enter the 
workforce. For this reason, employers today are placing a premium on so-called “soft 
skills,” which are “personality traits, goals, motivations, and preferences that are valued in 
the labor market, in school, and in many other domains” (Heckman and Kautz 2012). While 
soft skills are not the same thing as intellectual virtues, they include such virtues as 
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curiosity, attentiveness, perseverance, open-mindedness, and creativity. Thus by educating 
for intellectual virtues, teachers are helping prepare their students for success in the 
workplace.  
Second, good thinking is often a precondition for morally responsible action, which 
in turn is critical to living well or flourishing as a human being.18 In many instances, acting 
responsibly requires effective deliberation: it requires thinking carefully and thoroughly, 
evaluating options in an open and honest way, and maintaining the courage of one’s 
convictions. In other words, it requires thinking in a manner characteristic of many 
intellectual virtues. While the ability to deliberate well is not sufficient for acting well, it is 
one essential ingredient. Therefore, educating for intellectual virtues involves nurturing 
qualities that are central to human flourishing.  
We have seen that by conceiving of intellectual character growth as an important 
educational aim, teachers can have a positive impact on the personal formation of their 
students and equip them with abilities and other qualities that will benefit them 
substantially in the workplace and other areas of life. In this way, the aim in question is 
capable of illuminating for teachers the putative value of education.  
It is also capable of having a similar impact on the experience and understanding of 
students. We can approach this point by identifying a few additional features of an 
intellectual virtues educational model. First, as we have already seen, educating for 
intellectual virtues is an inherently personal process: it involves thinking of students, not 
merely as potential “high achievers” on standardized exams or the post-secondary 
equivalent thereof, but as “whole persons” or as persons whose basic beliefs, attitudes, and 
feelings about knowledge and learning also matter critically to the quality of their 
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education. This is very unlikely to escape the notice of students. Indeed, it is likely to make 
them feel respected and cared for as persons. Second, an intellectual virtues approach to 
education is necessarily social or relational. Personal change and growth occur most readily 
in the context of trusting and caring relationships.19 Therefore, teachers educating for 
intellectual virtues will place a premium on developing such relationships with their 
students.20 This is also likely to be evident to students and to enhance the felt quality of 
their educational experience. Third, an intellectual virtues approach to teaching is also 
reflective. It involves reflecting on and discussing with students the value of thinking and 
learning—both in general and with respect to the particular concepts, topics, and material 
at hand. In other words, it involves regularly pausing to identify or reflect on the 
significance of what is being taught. This is also likely to give students a deeper 
understanding of and appreciation for the education they are receiving.  
In this section, we have seen, first, that a good educational aim, when appropriately 
pursued, will give teachers and students a lively sense and better understanding of the 
value of education, and second, that the aim of growth in intellectual character virtues 
scores very well relative to this standard.  
3. Objections and Replies 
We have considered three arguments in support of the thesis that growth in 
intellectual virtues is an important educational aim. I turn now to consider two objections 
that might be raised in connection with this discussion.  
3.1. Intellectual virtues or academic standards? 
The first objection is practical. To some, the idea of placing a premium on nurturing 
intellectual character growth in students might seem like a nice idea in principle, while 
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nevertheless seeming untenable in reality. Teachers at every level are responsible for 
delivering content to their students. These demands are especially pressing where 
educational funding is tied closely to performance on standardized exams that measure 
competence in various academic standards. It might, then, be thought that teachers today 
must choose between teaching for intellectual virtues and teaching for required academic 
content and skills. And given the grave consequences of failing to do the latter, it might be 
thought that any serious concern with educating for intellectual virtues must be sidelined. 
It is important at this juncture to draw a distinction between “intellectual character 
education” and character education simpliciter or character education in its more familiar 
manifestations. Traditionally, efforts at character education have tended to focus on 
fostering moral or civic virtues like compassion, respect, tolerance, and integrity.21 While I 
think it is possible to wed academic instruction with character education understood in 
these ways, the present point is that this challenge is considerably less pressing when it 
comes to educating for intellectual virtues like curiosity, wonder, attentiveness, intellectual 
thoroughness, reflectiveness, or intellectual perseverance.22 As indicated above, intellectual 
virtues express themselves in intellectual actions like thinking, reasoning, interpreting, 
analyzing, reflecting, questioning, and so on. Thus engagement with academic content or 
standards provides a very natural opportunity for practicing a wide range of intellectual 
virtues, which in turn is critical to the formation of these traits. In short, one important way 
of fostering intellectual virtues is through active and reflective engagement with academic 
content. Indeed, by contrast with attempts to foster most moral or civic virtues, it is 
difficult to imagine a systematic program aimed at fostering intellectual virtues that did not 
involve something like this form of intellectual engagement.23 
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3.2. Intellectual virtues: an explicit goal? 
 A second objection acknowledges intellectual character growth as a worthy 
educational goal but questions the extent to which this goal should be made explicit, 
immediate, or deliberate. It might be said that good education will have—indeed always 
has had—the effect of making students more curious, open-minded, intellectually rigorous, 
intellectually courageous, and the like. However, it doesn’t follow that a concern with such 
growth should be an immediate or explicit focus of teachers or students. Indeed, it might be 
argued that by making this goal explicit, or by allowing virtue concepts or language to 
pervade the learning process, educators are likely to trivialize or otherwise undermine the 
willingness or ability of students to pursue the very goal at issue.24 
 My response to this objection is mixed. On the one hand, I acknowledge that some 
who attempt to educate for intellectual virtues in a more explicit or deliberate way may be 
drawn to methods or resources that threaten to trivialize or subvert their objective, for 
example, to the sorts of posters, pencils, slogans, t-shirts, bracelets, and other trinkets that 
have found their way into some character education curricula.25 Moreover, I reject the idea 
that the way to nurture intellectual character growth is through repeated exhortations to 
“try to be curious” or “to show open-mindedness.” As noted in the previous section, 
intellectual virtues come about through active engagement with ideas, claims, problems, 
narratives, arguments, and the like. These things—not the broader goal of becoming 
intellectually virtuous—are more likely to occupy the immediate focus of teachers and 
students operating within an intellectual virtues framework. 
On the other hand, there is something prima facie odd and questionable about the 
suggestion that while growth in intellectual virtues is a worthy educational goal, educators 
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need not concern themselves with this goal in any very explicit, deliberate, or systematic 
way—that, for instance, they need not offer any direct instruction in intellectual virtues, 
incorporate the language and concepts of intellectual virtue into their teaching and 
assessment practices, or think systematically about how the various elements of their 
courses might be related to the intellectual formation of their students.  
The question, it seems to me, is whether there exists an approach to intellectual 
character education that incorporates an explicit and systematic focus on intellectual 
virtues while avoiding the kind of trivialization and clumsiness noted above. In the 
remainder of the paper, I briefly describe seven plausible and interrelated measures for 
fostering intellectual character growth in an educational setting.26 Taken together, they 
suggest an affirmative answer to our question. They also provide a more concrete idea of 
what an intellectual virtues approach might look like in practice. 
The first measure is predicated on the idea that intellectual character growth in 
students is not merely a function of interactions that occur between them and their 
teachers in a classroom.  A supportive institutional culture also plays an important role.27 A 
school culture that promotes intellectual character growth will be one in which the 
commitment to educating for intellectual virtues is a critical part of the school’s identity. 
This commitment will figure prominently in how the school conceives of itself and how it 
presents itself to the world. Thus it will bear upon the school’s official mission, hiring and 
support of faculty, development and review of curricula, public relations and fund-raising 
campaigns, the stump speeches of top administrators, admissions standards, recruitment 
efforts, the speakers and other outside voices that are invited to campus, and so on. 
Institutional support may not always be overt or explicit. It might be reflected, for instance, 
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in a school’s deliberate focus on teaching for understanding (vs. the short-term 
memorization of isolated bits of knowledge), critical thinking, or intrinsic motivation.28  
A second measure is direct instruction in intellectual virtue concepts and 
terminology. Research on character education also underscores the importance of this 
strategy.29 The suggestion is that a rich and informed understanding of the nature and 
value of intellectual virtues can assist teachers and students alike in their attempts to 
embody or impart the traits in question. Thus, a teacher attempting to educate for 
intellectual virtues might begin the year or semester with a brief series of instructional 
lessons on what intellectual virtues are, their basic structure, what they look like in 
practice, their value within education and beyond, and how they differ both from other 
cognitive strengths like hard-wired cognitive abilities and intellectual skills as well as other 
character strengths like moral and civic virtues. If supported by brief explanations and 
illustrations over the course of the semester, this initial introduction need not consume a 
great deal of class time. 
Self-reflection and self-assessment are also important strategies for fostering 
intellectual virtues. They can be used to challenge students to apply their knowledge of 
intellectual virtues to how they understand their own intellectual character. This might 
involve the use of an intellectual character self-assessment tool or other exercises that 
invite students to reflect in honest and concrete ways about their own intellectual 
character strengths and weaknesses. Such methods could be employed in class, as 
homework, or as part of a broader advisory or mentoring program. The overarching goal 
would be a kind of robust self-knowledge that encourages students to begin thinking of 
themselves in light of intellectual virtue concepts and categories.   
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A fourth strategy involves making explicit connections between the course material 
and intellectual virtues and vices. These connections can be divided into two broad 
categories. The first includes connections that arise from the content of the material itself. 
Suppose, for instance, that a history or science teacher has committed to emphasizing and 
helping her students grow in three particular intellectual virtues. When it comes to 
studying certain events or figures in science or other areas, she might draw attention to 
and invite reflection on ways in which one or more of these virtues are manifested (or 
lacking) in these contexts. Similarly, a literature professor might use the concept of 
intellectual character as a “through line” for an entire course. He and his students might 
approach each narrative with an eye to the presence and significance of intellectual 
character traits or through the lens of a pre-established subset of intellectual virtues or 
vices. The second category includes connections that arise, not from the content being 
studied, but from demands associated with the mastery of this content. In the midst of an 
especially challenging unit, for instance, a teacher might pause to remind her students of 
the overarching personal or characterological goal of the course and of how the present 
challenge is related to that goal. Similarly, she might pause to specify which virtues—
whether perseverance, open-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, or otherwise—are 
especially relevant to acquiring a deep understanding of the material. It is important, of 
course, that the connections themselves be “organic” and that they be made by teachers in 
a way that is authentic and natural. Where this is accomplished, students will be in a better 
position to see and understand, not just themselves, but also the world around them in rich 
and informative virtue-relevant terms.30  
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The foregoing strategies are mainly ways of facilitating a certain kind of knowledge: 
they involve helping students understand what intellectual virtues are and why they 
matter, what their own intellectual character strengths and weaknesses are, and ways in 
which intellectual virtues are relevant to what they are learning and encountering in the 
world. This orientation by itself is a significant pedagogical and educational achievement. 
But it is no guarantee that students will actually begin to manifest the relevant traits in 
their intellectual activity. The final three measures are aimed at making some headway 
along this dimension.  
At least as far back as Aristotle, philosophers and other writers concerned with 
character development have maintained that character virtues (and vices) are formed 
through the practice or repetition of virtuous (or vicious) actions. As already noted, 
intellectual virtues express themselves in actions like reasoning, interpreting, analyzing, 
judging, evaluating, and so on. Accordingly, a fifth way of facilitating growth in intellectual 
virtues involves providing students with frequent opportunities to practice the actions 
characteristic of intellectual virtues.31 This might happen in class through activities or 
modes of interaction that require students to adopt standpoints other than their own, use 
their imagination to extend or apply their knowledge, give reasons in support of their 
claims, or ask thoughtful and well-formed questions. Such activities offer practice in virtues 
like open-mindedness, creativity, reflectiveness, intellectual rigor, and curiosity. Similar 
requirements can be built into exams, papers, and other written assignments. For instance, 
a teacher might encourage his students to strive for the end or goal proper to intellectual 
virtues by requiring them to demonstrate a firm personal understanding (as opposed to a 
mere restatement) of the material. Or he might stipulate that any time a student defends a 
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position, the student must attempt to identify the best possible arguments against this 
position and then respond to these arguments in ways that are intellectually charitable and 
fair.32 
A closely related strategy involves integrating virtue concepts and standards into 
formal and informal assessments. At an informal level, one important practice involves 
calling attention to and praising intellectually virtuous actions as they occur. Particularly 
where students have an understanding of what intellectual virtues are, and have come to 
appreciate their value, such feedback can have a powerful motivational effect. At a more 
formal level, if an exam, paper, or other assignment has been designed to encourage 
students to practice certain intellectual virtues, this ought to be reflected in the criteria or 
rubrics used to evaluate these assignments. Incorporating virtue concepts and standards 
into assessment in these ways is a further way of facilitating the practice of intellectual 
virtues.  
A final measure is also related to epistemic motivation. It consists of the natural and 
authentic modeling of intellectual virtues by teachers and other school leaders. The 
experience of being taught by an exemplar of intellectual virtue can be an extremely 
powerful invitation to the life of the mind.33 Witnessing how such a person reflects on, 
communicates, and feels about her subject matter can have a profound impact on a 
student’s fundamental beliefs and attitudes toward thinking and learning. Indeed, it is 
plausible to think that a teacher’s other efforts at fostering intellectual character growth 
will be strongly amplified or diminished to the extent that he models or fails to model 
intellectual virtues in his own intellectual activity. Accordingly, an indispensible part of 
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trying to educate for intellectual virtues involves exemplifying these virtues in one’s 
teaching and other interactions with students.34  
We have considered seven strategies for fostering growth in intellectual virtues. Our 
purpose has been to determine whether there might be a way of educating for intellectual 
virtues that is deliberate, explicit, and systematic, but that avoids the worries about 
trivialization and browbeating noted above. I take it that, when considered as a whole, the 
strategies just sketched warrant some optimism on this score. While far from exhaustive, 
they represent a multi-faceted but well-integrated approach to educating for intellectual 
virtues—one that includes many explicit appeals to intellectual virtue concepts but that is 
also thoughtful and sophisticated enough to avoid trivializing the goal intellectual character 
growth or otherwise undermining the willingness or ability of students to pursue this goal.  
Is such an approach likely to be successful? This depends in part on how exactly one 
thinks about “success.” If the question is whether, after several semesters or years of being 
educating in the forementioned ways, most students will graduate as paragons of 
intellectual virtue, then success may not be very likely. Suppose, however, that success is 
understood in terms of “meaningful progress” relative to the goal in question, that is, in 
terms of whether the strategies in question are capable of making an impact on the 
intellectual character of students significant enough to justify their use. While this remains 
largely an empirical matter, I take it that the discussion in the present section also justifies 





Alston, William. 2005. Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press).  
 
Baehr, Jason. 2011. The Inquiring Mind (Oxford: OUP).  
 
-----. Forthcominga. “The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue,” in Knowledge, Virtue, 
and Action, eds. Tim Henning and David Schweikard (London: Routledge).  
 
-----. Forthcomingb. “Sophia,” in Virtues and Their Vices, ed. Kevin Timpe and Craig Boyd 
(Oxford: OUP). 
 
Battaly, Heather. 2008. “Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophy Compass 3.4, pp. 639-63.  
 
-----. “Teaching Intellectual Virtues: Applying Virtue Epistemology in the Classroom,” 
Teaching Philosophy 29.3, pp. 191-222.  
 
Berkowitz, Marvin and Melinda Bier. 2005. “The Interpersonal Roots of Character 
Education,” in Character Psychology and Character Education, eds. D.K. Lapsley and F.C. 
Power (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press). 
 
-----. 2007. “What Works in Character Education,” Journal of Research in Character 
Education 5.1, pp. 29-48. 
 
 22 
Dewey, John. 1916. Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan).  
 
-----. 1902. The Child and the Curriculum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
 
Elgin, Catherine. 2011. “Science, Ethics and Education,” Theory and Research in Education 
9.3: 251-63.  
 
Ennis, Robert. 1985. “A Logical Basis for Measuring Critical Thinking Skills,” Educational 
Leadership 43.2, pp. 44-48. 
 
Hare, William. 1995. “Content and Criticism: the Aims of Schooling,” Journal of the 
Philosophy of Education 29.1, pp. 47-60.  
 
-----. 1993. What Makes a Good Teacher (London, Ontario: Althouse Press).  
 
 
Heckman, James and Tim Kautz. 2012. “Hard Evidence on Softs Skills,” Labour Economics 
19.4: pp. 451-464. 
 
Kotzee, Ben. 2011. “Education and ‘Thick’ Epistemology,” Educational Theory 61:5, pp. 549-
54.  
 
Kohn, Alfie. 1993. Punished by Rewards (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin).  
 23 
 
Lickona, Thomas. 1992. Educating for Character (New York: Bantam). 
 
Macallister, James. 2012. “Virtue Epistemology and the Philosophy of Education,” Journal of 
the Philosophy of Education 46:2, pp. 251-70. 
 
Oakeshott, Michael. 1967. “Learning and Teaching,” in The Concept of Education, ed. R.S. 
Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).  
 
Perkins, David. 1993. “Teaching for Understanding,” American Educator 17.3, pp. 28-35. 
 
Montmarquet, James. 1992. Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield). 
 
Ritchhart, Ron. 2001. Intellectual Character (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass).  
 
Roberts, Robert and Jay Wood. 2007. Intellectual Virtues (Oxford: OUP). 
 
Seider, Scott. 2012. Character Compass (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP).  
 
Siegel, Daniel. 2001. The Developing Mind (New York: Guilford Press). 
 
Siegel, Harvey. 1985. Educating Reason (New York: Routledge). 
 24 
 
-----. 2004. “High Stakes Testing, Educational Aims and Ideals, and Responsible 
Assessment,” Theory and Research in Education 2.3, pp. 219-33.  
 
Stipek, Deborah. 2001. Motivation to Learn (New York: Pearson).  
 
Walker, Lawrence. 2002. “Moral Exemplarity,” in Bringing in a New Era of Character 
Education (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute Press).  
 
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP).  
 
Wiske, Martha Stone. 1997. Teaching for Understanding (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass). 
 
Zagzebski, Linda. 1996. Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: CUP).  
 
                                                        
1 This conception of intellectual virtues differs significantly from that of other historical 
authors like Aristotle, for whom intellectual virtues are closer to cognitive powers or 
abilities than they are intellectual character traits. See Zagebski (1996) for a discussion of 
For some recent treatments, see Battaly (2008), Roberts and Wood (2007), Zagzebski 
(1996), and Baehr (2011). For a recent treatment on the relevance of virtue epistemology 
to issues in the philosophy of education, see Macallister (2012). 
2 “Typically thought of” is significant, since there may be a sufficiently broad notion of the 
moral or morality according to which intellectual virtues are a subset of moral virtues. For 
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more on the relationship between intellectual virtues and moral virtues seep the appendix 
of my (2011).  
3 For a development of this point, see Chapters 6 and of my (2011). There I note that the 
present formulation holds only for “active” virtues, which, unlike “passive” or “negative” 
virtues, have an active dimension.  
4 Henceforth I use the term “lifelong learner” to refer to the putative character of this state 
or ideal. Thus my aim in this section is to offer a more specific account of (at least one 
central part of) what teachers, administrators, and others have in mind when they uphold 
the value of “lifelong learning” or trying to make their students into “lifelong learners.”  
5 See my (forthcominga). As I explain in that work, “passive” virtues present exceptions to 
each of the two requirements just noted. Passive virtues are manifested in the absence of 
certain concerns or actions. Such exceptions present no problem, however, for the broader 
point being made here.  
6 Similar arguments could be made about related notions like “critical thinking” or the 
“education of the whole person.” 
7 See Williams (1985). For a recent application of this notion to epistemology and 
education, see Kotzee (2011).  
8 It is, in fact, quite difficult to pin down exactly which two desiderata Dewey had in mind, if 
indeed there really are only two (the details seem to vary from description to another). 
Thus my interest here is perhaps best understood as two desiderata that are at least in the 
immediate vicinity of what Dewey had in mind.   
9 See my (forthcomingb).  
10 See (Roberts and Wood 2007: 156-59) or Alston (2005: 32).   
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11 As this suggests, the kind of understanding sought by an intellectually virtuous agent is 
indeed factual or true. The point is that truth or true belief is not the only aim proper to 
intellectual virtues. For more on what it looks like to teach for deep understanding, see 
Perkins (1993) and Wisdke (1997). 
12 Thus I think of rigor in this context as partly a function of the content being taught and 
partly a function of the sorts of demands it places on learners.  
13 Each of these approaches clearly has its strengths. My point at present is that the value 
instantiated by each one needs to be constrained or complemented by a value instantiated 
by the other, and that educating for intellectual virtues provides a natural way of 
integrating both values.  
14 See e.g. Siegel (1988), Ennis (1985), and Dewey (1916).  
15 If all critical thinking programs were to incorporate an additional focus on intellectual 
character, then an intellectual virtues approach would not have the advantage I am 
suggesting. But neither would this tell in favor of a critical thinking approach vis-à-vis an 
intellectual virtues approach. Indeed, if the attention to intellectual character development 
were sufficiently strong and central, the approach in question might not differ in any 
important way from an intellectual virtues approach, for as indicated earlier in the paper, 
intellectual virtues have a skill or ability component that requires competence in at least 
many of the skills proper to “critical thinking.” 
16 See Siegel (2004).  
17 Ben Kotzee has suggested to me that belief in the value of one’s education is partly 
constitutive of a good education. Assuming this is right, it follows that an intellectual virtues 
approach—focusing as it does on, among other things, students; perception and 
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understanding of the value of thinking and learning—easily satisfies one important 
requirement on any plausible educational model.   
18 For an account of the relationship between intellectual virtue and morally responsible 
action, see Montmarquet (2003).  
19 See Siegel (2001). As Ben Kotzee has suggested to me, intellectual (and other character) 
virtues may be social or relational in an even deeper sense, for it may be that such traits 
can be fostered only in the context of a community. For present purposes, I shall leave this 
an open question.  
20 This is not, of course, an advantage entirely unique to an intellectual virtues approach. 
The point is rather that an educator operating within this framework will have an 
additional strong reason to form trusting and caring relationships with her students, the 
reason being, again, that doing so is critical to the formative goal of an intellectual virtues 
approach.  
21 See Lickona (1992).  
22 For ways in which educating for moral character can be combined with academic 
instruction, see Lickona (2001) and Elgin (2011).  
23 For a related point, see Hare (1995).  
24 See e.g. Oakeshott (1967: p. 176).  
25 For a critique of these approaches to character education, see Kohn (1993); and for an 
alternative approach, see Berkowitz and Bier (2005).  
26 These are not at all exhaustive. I propose them as a kind of basic framework that could 
easily be added to. See Ritchhart (2001) for several additional strategies. And see 
Berkowitz and Bier’s treatment (2007) of traditional or moral character education for 
 28 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
several strategies and principles that have also application to intellectual character 
education. Seider (2012) is also instructive in this regard. 
27 This is one of the findings in Berkowitz and Bier (2007).  
28 For a discussion of the latter see Stipek (2001). 
29 See Berkowitz and Bier (2007 and 2005).  
30 For additional examples along these lines, see Battaly (2006).   
31 Here as well see Battaly (2006). Ron Ritchhart’s discussion of “thinking routines” in his 
(2001) also sheds valuable light on what might look like to give students frequent 
opportunities to practice various intellectual virtues. See especially pp. 85-114.  
32 Of course, this is something that many good teachers already do. This underscores the 
way in which an intellectual virtues framework can provide educators with the concepts 
and language to better understand, articulate, and practice much of what they already 
value and are trying to accomplish with students.  
33 See e.g. (Oakshott 1967) and (Walker 2002).  
34 This points to what I take to be the greatest challenge involved with educating for 
intellectual virtues, namely, the adequate training and formation of teachers and other 
school leaders. Much of the work of William Hare (e.g. 1993) sheds valuable light on how 
this challenge might be addressed. While Hare’s focus tends to be the focus of open-
mindedness in particular, much of what he says applies to the full range of intellectual 
virtues.  
35 I am grateful to Ben Kotzee, Dan Speak, William Hare, Michael Pace, an anonymous 
referee, and an audience at Chapman University in the fall of 2012 for helpful feedback on 
earlier drafts of this paper or related material.  
